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TOWARD AN EQUITABLE AND WORKABLE PROGRAM
OF MOBILE HOME TAXATION
INTRODUCTION
INCREASED use of mobile homes as permanent housing invites re-examina-
tion and reappraisal of mobile home taxation. This Note will evaluate existing
tax practices in light of the functions mobile homes presently perform, and
suggest a tax system calculated to promote equality of tax treatment between
owners of mobile homes and owners of conventional housing.
Between 1951 and 1956 the mobile home population doubled ;1 it currently
totals over 3,000,000 persons. 2 The number of mobile homes in use grew
from 550,000 in 1953 3 to 1,200,000 in 1959.4 This figure has been augmented
by mobile homes recently produced-produced at a rate which exceeds 10
per cent of the private single family housing starts in this country.5
For many years communities viewed the house trailer as the source of at
least three major problems: its presence was expected to blight surrounding
areas, causing property values to fall; its occupants were often viewed as
personally undesirable; and the municipal expense attributable to trailerites
was expected to exceed the revenue which could be raised from them.
Community fear of blight can be traced to the low quality of both the early
trailers and their parking facilities. Economic conditions of the 'thirties,
followed by wartime housing shortages and rapid relocations of the labor
force, pressed many thousands of unattractive trailers into permanent use.,
Often these units were without running water or sanitary facilities.7 There
1. HODES & ROBERTSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES 3 (1957) [hereinafter cited HODES
& ROBERTSON].
2. BARTLEY & BAIR, MOBILE HOME PARKS AND COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY PLANNING
12 (1960) [hereinafter cited BARTLEY & BAIR].
3. 57 DICK. L. REV. 338 (1953).
4. Fogarty, Trailer Parks: The Wheeled Suburbs, 111 Architectural Forum, July
1959, p. 127 [hereinafter cited as Fogarty].
5. BAIR, MOBILE HOMES AND THE GENERAL HOUSING SUPPLY, Nov. 28, 1961, p. 2.
For statistical purposes units over 29 feet in length have been considered mobile homes.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 760 (1961) ; Construction Review, March
1961, p. 4. Most "travel trailers" are 15-16 feet long. Few units between 25 and 40 feet in
length are sold. Peter Henry Associates, The Market for Light Trailer Brakes in the
U.S.A., 1960, p. 23.
6. Some people, forced from their homes by mortgage foreclosure, took refuge in
trailers. See Fogarty 127; Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 504, 286 N.W. 805, (1939).
The federal government alone purchased 38,000 22-foot trailers to house production workers
during World War II. HODES & ROBERTSON 2. For contemporary discussion of efforts
made, by particular communities, to meet problems created by the influx of trailer housed
defense workers, see Franklin, On the Local Front, 31 NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 336-38 (1942).
7. HODES & ROBERTSON 1; see Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio St. 484, 488,
40 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1942) ; Wellington, Trailer Camp Slums, 87 THE SURVEY 418, 419
(1951).
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were no construction standards to insure even minimum protection against
fire or collapse.8 They were parked in areas which were usually crowded,
poorly equipped, and generally unsuited to residential use. As a result,
conditions in these parks seldom exceeded minimum health and sanitation
standards." The specter of such parks teeming with tiny trailers made com-
munity apprehension understandable. But substantial improvements in the
quality of both mobile homes and park facilities may have undermined the
bases for this antipathy today. The mobile home currently produced is an
attractive, completely furnished, efficiently spacious dwelling for which na-
tional construction standards have been adopted and enforced by the manu-
facturers' associations." ° Some of today's parks are landscaped, and feature
ample lots imaginatively arranged around paved streets." Recreation facili-
ties-such as swimming pools, boat docks and playgrounds-found in high
quality parks could be the envy of conventional housing developments.
Although many parks have yet to match such progress,' 2 communities have
ample power to require improvement of existing facilities and to set high
standards for future park construction. 3 They need only exercise it.
Community distaste for trailer dwellers personally developed at a time
when the trailerites were often considered footloose, nomadic people unlikely
to make any positive contribution to community life.14 The early trailer was
8. Many early trailers were homemade. A Fortune Magazine survey found that only
35,000 of the 55,000 trailers produced in 1936 were factory made. Cited in Preface to
AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, THE HOUSE TRAILER (Report 115, 1937) [hereinafter
cited as 1937 REPORT]. The possibility of conflagration in areas congested with flammable
trailers was recognized, id. at 1, and communities sought to reduce this potential hazard by
prohibiting trailers, AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, HOUSE TRAILER REGULATION
(Report 147, July 1941, at 9-10) [hereinafter cited as 1941 REPORT], or requiring park
owners to take such precautions as providing fire fighting equipment, id. at 7-9.
9. See generally BARTLEY & BAIR 1-3; Wellington, Trailer Camp Sluns, 87 THE
SURvEy 418 (1951) ; Fogarty 128.
10. MOBILE HOME MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, 10TH ANNUAL INDUSTRY REPORT
8 (1961) [hereinafter cited 10TH ANNUAL REPORT]. These standards, however, apply only
to electrical, plumbing, and heating equipment and installations; they apparently do not
cover exterior construction. BARTLEY & BAIR 31.
11. Fogarty 128.
12. 0TH ANNUAL REPORT 12; Fogarty bluntly summarized the situation:
Indeed, if the standards of the average trailer were even remotely approached by
those of the average trailer park, there might he considerable community tolerance
of trailer living, which there is not. The rub is in the trailer park.
Fogarty 128.
13. See BARTLEY & BAIR 101-05.
14. Some of the best examples of this conception of trailer residents are found in
judicial opinions. See, e.g., Commissioners of Anne Arundel County v. English, 182 Md.
514, 530 (1943) ("Other forms of taxation to reach the nomadic type of people who reside
in such structures have been suggested.") ; Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 506, 514,
286 N.W. 805, 810-11 (1939) (Court upheld ordinance limiting trailer residence stating,
"Ordinances having for their purpose . . . the attraction of a desirable citizenship . . .
are within the proper ambit of the police power.") ; Streyle v. Board of Assessors, 173
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used primarily by tourists and transient workers ;15 the permanent residents
who did use trailers were likely to be low income workers with temporary
positions. 6 Mobile homes, however, can no longer be said to be inhabited
primarily by migratory paupers; according to recent surveys, the present
occupations and incomes of their occupants vary widely. Skilled workers,
many of whom are engaged in construction or mineral development, now
seem to form the largest single group of mobile home owners.17 Many mobile
homes are also used by military personnel,' 8 young couples,19 and retired
persons. 20 Even professional people, perhaps attracted by the comfort avail-
able in a high quality mobile home and park, perhaps by tax economies,21
currently represent a large segment of the mobile home population. 22 With
the increasing variety of occupational groups living in mobile homes has
come a substantial upgrading in income level. In 1958, the median income
of mobile home dwellers ($5,250)23 was approximately the same as the na-
tional average ($5,300).24 There seems little justification, therefore, for any
continuing personal antipathy. toward mobile home dwellers as a group.
If developments in home and park construction should have alleviated
community fears that mobile homes cause blight and attract undesirable resi-
dents, increased use of mobile homes has aggravated the financial problems of
Pa. Super. 324, 327 (1953) ("Trailer folk for the most part are nomads at heart .... ") ;
Crawford v. Wesleyville, 68 Pa. D. & C. 215, 218 (C.P. 1949) (Parks ". . . frequently
attract a nomadic, promiscuous and careless population. . ...") ; Yorkville v. Fonk, 3 Wis.2d
371, 376-77, 88 N.W.2d 319, 322, appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 58 (1958) ("Trailers . . .
lack the permanency ... conducive to the well-ordered development of the community.").
15. In 1937 "the vast majority of trailerites" were tourists whose average residence
varied from one to thirty days. Few trailers were then used by transient workers. 1937
REPORT 4. The use by workers, foreseen in 1937, materialized during World War II. See
generally Franklin, On the Local Front 31 NAT'L MuNIc. REv. 336 (1942) ; Fogarty 127.
16. See 1937 REPORT 20; Fogarty 127; Wellington, Trailer Camp Sluhs, 87 SuRVEv
418,421 (1951).
17. Thirty seven per cent of mobile home owners are skilled workers. 197 EcoNoMisT
1233 (1960).
18. Military personnel own 20% of the mobile homes. Ibid.
19. Cf. HODES & ROBERTSON 4-5.
20. Approximately 10% of mobile homes are owned by retired people. 197 ECooMIsT
1233 (1960).
21. See BARTLEY & BAIR 110.
22. Professional people own 18% of the mobile homes. 197 ECONOMIST 1233 (1960).
23. BARTLEY & BAIR 8.
24. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-60, No. 22, Jan.
15, 1960, at 1.
The proportion of mobile home owners with annual incomes above $2,000, from $2,000 to
$5,000, and from $5,000 to $7,000 is greater than that of the general population. In 1958, 14.3%
of United States families had incomes of $2,000 or less, but only 3.2% of mobile home
families did. A greater proportion of mobile home families had incomes between $2,000 and
$5,000: 41.8% to 34.4%. In the $5,000-$7,000 bracket were 31.3% of mobile home families,
but only 24.4% of other families. Over $7,000 there was only a slight gap: 23.7% of mobile
home families, 26.9% of all other families. Compare BARTLEY & BAIR 8, with U.S. DEP'r OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-60, No. 33, Jan. 15, 1960, at 1.
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many municipalities.2 5 Tax programs designed to cope with transients' use
of early trailers may not be adequate where mobile homes are used as perman-
ent dwellings. The mobility of the early "trailers" and the transiency of their
occupants made impractical a tax which required continuous local discovery,
assessment and enforcement.26 In view of these collection difficulties, the
drain on community budgets caused by the relatively few, usually low-income
trailerites may not have warranted the development of a particular tax pro-
gram for them. In any event, when trailer dwellers were viewed as a significant
financial liability, the problem was often eliminated rather than solved by
prohibiting trailers or limiting the time a trailer might remain in the com-
munity.27 This ostrich approach is no longer adequate or necessary. Periods
of mobile home residence have gradually increased and it has been claimed
that mobile home residents are now as permanent as residents of multi-
family conventional housing.28 This increasing immobility, by relieving the
pressure for speedy collection, should permit consideration of a wider range
of tax alternatives. Since mobile homes today require "the entire range of
urban facilities,"29 it is worth discovering how their occupants can best be
made to pay "their fair share" of community expenses.
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE TAX PROGRAMS
Mobile homes have usually been taxed, if at all, as motor vehicles, as
personal property or through periodic fees. Occasionally, local assessors have
attempted to tax mobile homes as realty,30 and several states have recently
enacted statutes authorizing the inclusion of mobile homes in realty assess-
ments. 31 In evaluating the several forms of mobile home taxation, it will be
assumed that communities which permit the use of mobile homes as residences
will expect their occupants to support local budgets and that these mobile
25. Municipal expenditures attributable to mobile home residents are similar to those
occasioned by other residents. Expense is incurred inspecting and regulating parks, furnish-
ing fire and police protection, and disposing of sewage and garbage. Pressure placed on
school facilities and budgets by children from mobile home families has been a constant
problem for communities. See 1937 REPORT 20; 1941 REPORT 24-25; BARTLEY & BAIR 107.
26. See 1937 REPORT 18-19.
27. See, e.g., 1941 REPORT 18; Brooklyn, Ohio, Ordinance to Regulate Trailers and
Trailer Camps, July 8, 1940 (construed and upheld in Renker v. City of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio
St. 484, 40 N.E2d 925 (1942) and Stary v. City of Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d
11 (1954) ; Spitler v. Town of Munster, 214 Ind. 75, 14 N.E.2d 579 (1938) (ordinance limit-
ing mobile home residence to 30 days upheld).
28. BARTLEY & BAIR 6. In 1954 the average mobile home was moved about once each
year, Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 738, 751 n.66 (1955) ; today the figure is 24 to 30 months.
Business Week, March 19, 1960, p. 62.
29. 10TH ANNUAL REPORT 7.
30. See, e.g., Stewart v. Carrington, 203 Misc. 543, 119 N.Y.S.2d 7.78 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ;
Mason Appeal, 75 Pa. D. & C. 1 (C.P. 1950).
31. See N.Y. TAx LAWS § 2 (6-a) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-021 (Supp. 1960) ;
MONT. REv. Cons ANN. § 84-301 (Supp. 1961).
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home owners should be taxed on the same basis as other residents unless
adequate reasons can be found for disparate treatment.
Motor Vehicle Tax
When the homes were highly mobile, the ease of collecting a motor vehicle
tax may have justified its use in preference to other means of taxation. En-
forcement could be facilitated by requiring mobile homes to bear license plates
when in transit and authorizing police to halt units moving without a license.32
This ease of collection perhaps offset the fact that in many states the pay-
ment of a motor vehicle tax exempted the mobile home from local taxation.m3
On the other hand, under the early programs state-collected motor vehicle
tax proceeds were not returned to the locality in which the mobile home was
located.3 4 Thus, the communities which supplied services to the trailerites re-
ceived no compensation from the vehicle tax. Furthermore, differences in the
value of individual units were reflected, if at all,35 only crudely in registra-
tion fees graduated according to weight,36 length 37 or number of supporting
axles.38
Perhaps partially in recognition of the developments in the mobile home
field, numerous modifications have been made in the administration of vehicle
tax systems. Today's motor vehicle tax receipts from mobile homes are
usually distributed to the local governments in which the homes are located.30
Current valuation techniques have been substantially refined also, with most
states graduating registration fees by manufacturer's list price or actual resale
value of similar models. 40 Even now, however, state valuation based solely
on manufacturer's price seldom acknowledges the state policy on taxing
home furnishings: in states where furnishings are taxed, those, added to a
mobile home after purchase are not, while in states where furnishings are not
otherwise taxed, those included in the manufacturer's price may be.41
32. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-302 (1956). In Oregon, sheriffs are supposed
to search for unlicensed mobile homes even if not in transit. ORE. REv. STAT. § 481.504
(1959).
33. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-644 (1956) ; CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 10758; FLA.
STAT. § 320.081 (1958) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-11-14 (1960).
34. 1937 REPO RT 20-21; cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.20 (1958).
35. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.081 (1958) ; DEl.. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1931 (Supp.
1960).
36. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 14-47 (1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 22, §
16-111 (1954) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2501(b) (1960).
37. E.g., Idaho Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 64, § 1, at 256.
38. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-11-12(B) (1960).
39. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1591 (B) (1956); CAL. REv. & TAX CODE §
11003.3. Some states still retain a portion of the registration receipts. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 49-155 (1961) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-11-12 (1960).
40. E.g., ARiz. CONST. art. 9, § 11; CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 10752; COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4-6 (1953) ; ME. REv. ANN. ch. 22, § 51-A (1954).
41. Some states, however, do reduce mobile home valuations specifically to represent
the value of furnishings. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-6 (1953).
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Fundamentally, however, the motor vehicle tax is an inappropriate means
of taxing today's relatively permanent mobile homes. Only with difficulty-
if at all-could centrally determined valuation schemes be modified to take
account of the often substantial permanent additions to mobile homes.42 But
even if this could be accomplished, the vehicle tax would remain an un-
necessarily inaccurate means of compensating communities for the govern-
mental cost occasioned by mobile homes and their occupants, for vehicle taxes
do not reflect differences in the level of public services provided by the
various communities within a state.43 While the cost of municipal services is
generally mirrored in local real and personal property assessment ratios and
mill rates, motor vehicle taxes are generally uniform throughout a state
despite the differing expenditure levels of its municipalities. The inevitable
result is relative under-taxation of mobile homes in some areas and relative
over-taxation in others."
Personal Property Tax
In many states mobile homes are taxed as personal property.45 In some of
these, mobile homes on which vehicle taxes have been paid are exempted
from the personal property levy.4" In the others, the mobile home is treated
essentially like other property in the community. Usually both the assess-
ment of the home and the determination of the mill rate are governed by
local practices. 47 The personal property tax is therefore inherently better
suited to reflecting the general level of local services than is any uniform
state-wide schedule of license fees.
The personal property tax, however, is not a completely satisfactory solu-
tion to the problem of mobile home taxation. Many states do not presently
tax personal property at all.48 In such states it would be inefficient to adminis-
ter a special tax on this one form of property. And even where a personal
property tax exists, rarely is it effectively collected. 49 There are potential en-
42. Additions may be as large as the mobile home itself Bair, Mobile Homes and the
General Housing Supply, Nov. 28, 1961, p. 1.
43. Cf. Iowa Legislative Research Bureau, Taxation of Mobile Homes, Bulletin 21, p.
10 (1959) [hereinafter cited Iowa Bulletin].
44. This problem is not eliminated by applying an average state tax rate to the
centrally determined value as is done in several states. See, e.g., ARiz. CONsT. art. 9,'§ 11;
NEB. REv. STAT. § 77.1240.01 (1958).
45. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-643 (1956) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 200.45 (1958);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 499 (Smith-Hurd 1954) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-101 (1949).
46. See, e.g., Aaxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-644 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.081
(1958).
47. But see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4503.06(E) (Page Supp. 1961). The new Ohio
mobile home tax is computed and assessed locally, using the local tax rate, but the value
of the home is determined by a statutory formula.
48. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 102 (1953) ; N.Y. TAx LAws § 3; cf. OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 5709.01 (1954).
49. BARTLEY & BAm 111-12; MORTON, HOUSING TAXATION 77 (1955); see generally
1962]
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forcement procedures: Some personal property tax statutes permit distraint,
attachment, or garnishment even before taxes are due.50 Before such severe
sanctions are applied to mobile homes, however, cognizance ought to be taken
of the uniform reluctance to invoke them against other forms of housing.
Statutes which permit forced sales of real estate for delinquent taxes in-
variably provide substantial redemption periods; a sale of personal property
for taxes, on the other hand, is almost always absolute-giving the owner
no opportunity to redeem.51 It is difficult to justify disregard for the principle
that a home should not be lost because its owner is temporarily unable to
pay taxes on the ground that the home is mobile and therefore "personal,"
not "real" property. Similarly, it is difficult to see why mobile home owners
who would be entitled to special exemptions as veterans0 2 or widows,6 3 for
example, if their homes had been classified as realty, should be denied similar
exemptions simply because their homes are taxed as personalty.
The Fee System
Some states and communities have sought to charge mobile home dwellers
for the public benefits they enjoy by collecting a periodic fee from the owners
of the homes or parks. This fee system seems to have several advantages
for the local government which the motor vehicle and personal property taxes
often lack. The proceeds go directly to local governments or school districts
in which the mobile homes are located. 4 The difficulties of appraising in-
dividual units are usually avoided by imposing uniform fees-ranging from
$15 to $120 per year-regardless of the value of the home.6 5 When park
owners are held responsible for the fee collection, as is often the case, the
local government is saved the expense of locating homes and collecting fees.;
Moreover, when the park owner's fee takes the form of a license tax grad-
POOLE, PUBLIC FINANCE & ECONOMIC WELFARE 279 (1956); DUE, GOVERN'MENT FINANCE
391 (1959).
50. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 694 (1959) ; AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-349 (1956);
ARK. STAT. § 84-914 (1960).
51. E.g., compare ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §42-421(A) (1956), weith ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 42-614 (C) (1956). Mobile homes in California are protected from sale for taxes.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 690.24, .27.
52. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 5 (22d exemption) (Supp. 1961).
53. Ibid. (17th exemption).
54. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1933 (Supp. 1960).
55. Delaware imposes a flat $15 annual fee on each mobile home which has been in the
state 30 days or more. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1931 (Supp. 1960). Neptune City, New
Jersey attempted to impose a fee of $10 per month per home on park operators. This fee was
found confiscatory and the enabling ordinance was set aside. Hoffman v. Neptune City, 137
N.J.L. 485 (1948). But cf. Iowa imposes a monthly fee graduated according to the home's
length. IOwA CODE ANN. § 135D.9 (Supp. 1960).
56. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 135D.10 (Supp. 1960); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.278(71)
(1961) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.058(3) (c) (Supp. 1961) ; cf. Kelly v. City of San Diego, 63
Cal. App. 2d 638, 640-41 (1944) ; Mason Appeal, 75 Pa. D. & C. 1, 2-3 (C.P. 1950).
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uated according to the capacity of the park, it-tends to insure a predictable,
collectible, minimum contribution on behalf of (and ultimately from) mobile
home dwellers.5 7 And, in states which consider mobile homes to be personal
property non-taxable under state law or which permit them to be registered
as motor vehicles and exempt from local taxation once registered, the fee
system may be the only means available to local governments for collecting
revenue, directly or indirectly, from the home owners.
On the other hand, the fee system, like both personal property and motor
vehicle taxes, treats mobile home occupants as distinct from other residents.
While the realty tax imposed on others is keyed to property value, the fees
paid by mobile home inhabitants do not reflect disparities in the values of
individual homes and additions. 58 Indeed, some people advocate a fee system
precisely because it need not be tied to property values and can be based on
the costs of furnishing municipal services directly to mobile home residents. 9
This differential treatment has prompted some mobile home owners to chal-
lenge fees as a denial of their right to equal protection.60 While some courts
seem to have so held, the equal protection finding is often make-weight, state
law providing sufficient grounds for refusing to enforce the fees.61 Elsewhere,
moreover, fee systems have been held constitutional when contested on equal
protection grounds.62 And this result seems more in line with the long-term
trend toward a more permissive review of the reasonableness of distinctions
drawn by legislatures for tax purposes.6
57. E.g., COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-2 (1954); ILl.. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 Y, § 169
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960) ; cf. Kelly v. City of San Diego, 63 Cal. App. 2d 638, 640 (1944) ;
Michaels v. Township Comm. of Pemberton, 3 N.J. Super. 523, 527 (1949) ; White v. City
of Richmond, 293 Ky. 477, 478 (1943).
58. Barnes v. City of West Allis, 275 Wis. 31, 35, 81 N.W.2d 75, 78 (1957) (uniform
fee imposed on homes valued from $500 to $5,000) ; Anne Arundel County v. English, 182
Md. 514, 524, 35 A.2d 135, 140 (1943) (uniform fee imposed on homes valued from $300 to
$2,500) ; Iowa Bulletin 9-10.
Mobile homes currently produced range in price from $3,500 to more than $12,000. 1OTl
ANNuAL REPORT 6.
59. See 1937 REPORT 19-20; 1941 REPORT 21-22; Iowa Bulletin 10-11.
60. See Anne Arundel County v. English, 182 Md. 514, 35 A.2d 135 (1943) ; Rapa v.
Haines, 101 N.E.2d 733 (Ct. C.P. 1951), aff'd, 113 N.E.2d 121 (County Ct. App.), appeal
disuissed, 158 Ohio St. 275, 108 N.E.2d 833 (1952) ; Crawford v. Wesleyville, 68 Pa. D.
& C. 215 (C.P. 1949) ; Barnes v. City of West Allis, 275 Wis. 31, 81 N.W.2d 75 (1957).
61. Anne Arundel County v. English, supra note 60 (fee found a property tax not ap-
portioned according to value, as required by Maryland Declaration of Rights.) Crawford v.
Wesleyville, supra note 60, (ordinance imposing a fee violated Pennsylvania Constitution by
attempting to license "the right to live in a home....")
62. Barnes v. City of West Allis, 275 Wis. 31, 81 N.W.2d 75 (1957) ; Rapa v. Haines,
101 N.E.2d 733 (Ct. C.P. 1951), aff'd, 113 N.E.2d 121 (County Ct. App.), appeal dismissed,
158 Ohio St. 275, 108 N.E.2d 833 (1952).
63. See, e.g., Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) ; Charleston Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945) ; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310
U.S. 362 (1940).
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An attempt to make mobile home residents responsible inter se for the
additional expenses attributable to them by adoption of a fee system would
involve conceptually difficult accounting problems. For example, what propor-
tion of local administrative expense, or police or fire protection costs are
really attributable to mobile home residents? Should the cost of municipal
recreation facilities be allocated equally to owners who reside in parks
furnishing extensive recreational facilities and those who depend on the
public facilities? If this special tax treatment of mobile home residents is
justified by their potential mobility, should they be required to contribute
to permanent community improvements? Should their contribution be limited
to a portion of current depreciation? Difficult as these problems may be, an
approximate allocation of costs can doubtless be made.0 4 The fundamental
objection to taxing mobile homes through fees based on the value of services
received lies not in the conceptual difficulties of allocation but in the special
treatment of these residents. So long as other dwellings are taxed by an ad
valorem property tax, the fee system is subject to the same criticism made of
taxing mobile homes as motor vehicles or personal property: It discriminates
between residents.
A General Criticism Justified.
The principal objection therefore to the vehicle tax, the personal property
tax, and the fee system as applied to mobile homes is that, since they co-
exist with another form of tax-the realty tax, applicable to owners of
stationary homes-they inevitably cause an undesirable inequality in the tax
burdens of the owners of homes. The point is not that the mobile home owner
pays more (or less) than his counterpart in a permanent home, but that he
is taxed differently. This insistence on equality of tax treatment is predicated
on a belief that the once tenable distinction between the occupants of mobile
and stationary housing has outlived its utility. 5 It further assumes that
64. By statute Wisconsin permits communities to compute monthly fees "equal to actual
cost of services furnished by the school district ... and the cost of the municipal services
... ." Wis. STAT. AN. § 66.058(3) (c) (1957). The constitutionality of this statute was
upheld in Barnes v. City of West Allis, 275 Wis. 31, 81 N.W.2d 75 (1957). Over 200 Wis-
consin communities have imposed such fees. BARTLEy & BAir 116.
65. The reasonableness of the separate classification of mobile homes may well stand or
fall on their actual, not potential, mobility. Few dwellings are absolutely immobile; the
question is how immobile must a dwelling be to escape the "mobile" classification? As the
mobile home becomes increasingly permanent, see note 28 supra and accompanying text, dif-
ferentiation on the basis of mobility should, and probably will, lose its vitality. State courts
seem to have recognized this. See, e.g., New York Trailer Coach Ass'n v. Steckel, 208
Misc. 308, 144 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 3 App. Div. 2d 643,
158 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1956) ; Barnes v. Gorham, 12 Misc. 2d 285, 175 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct.
1957). The Wisconsin legislature recently amended its fee statute and no longer applies a
monthly fee to a home if the value of additions "equals or exceeds 50 per cent of ... [its]
value...." Wis. STAT. AN. § 66.058 (1) (e) (Supp. 1961) (emphasis added).
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equality of tax treatment would focus the community decision process on impor-
tant policy considerations often obscured by the maintenance of a separate tax
program for mobile homes.
Tax equality would eliminate one justification for dissatisfaction with the
tax system (even if dissatisfaction itself were not eradicated) : residents of
standard homes could no longer accuse mobile home owners of failing to
pay their "fair share" of community expenses; nor could the mobile home
owners any longer object to the discrimination often reflected in fee systems.
Such equality might also further the identification of mobile home owners
with the community and its acceptance of them. 6 Those mobile home owners
who would find their tax burdens increased by extension of the real property
tax might find some other effects to their benefit. Communities which presently
prohibit or limit the use of mobile homes might reconsider their position once
satisfied that these homes will not be a financial liability.67 The mobile home
owner might gain a voice in local freeholder elections, where today he is
denied a vote even though his home may be more valuable, his tax payments
greater, and his residence longer than freeholders. 68
Elimination of a separate tax scheme for mobile, as distinguished from
"permanent," home owners would also increase the effectiveness of legislative
policies embraced in exemption statutes. Such policies could, of course, be
implemented by being incorporated into more than one tax program (e.g,
one for "permanent" property and another for "mobile" homes). Too
frequently, however, communities have yielded to the tendency to ignore the
internal diversity of the group covered by the special tax or fee system. The
result is that sub-groups such as widows, orphans, elderly persons, and
veterans who own mobile homes are grouped as mobile home owners and
denied exemptions they would receive if only they occupied regular housing
units.6 This situation ignores the fact that the policies underlying the exemp-
tion of the sub-groups apply regardless of whether they live in mobile or
stationary housing. If the effect of the exemptions when applied to mobile
home owners would be to remove inexpensive mobile homes from the tax
rolls and if this is deemed undesirable, the better solution would be to alter
the exemption laws, not to withhold the exemption from the widows, orphans,
and veterans who live in mobile homes. It is submitted that the dynamics of
legislative action are such that this is more likely to be accomplished if all
home owners are made subject to the same form of taxation. The question
remains, however: what form of tax is to be preferred?
66. See BARTLEY & BAnR 66.
67. Interview with Sydney Adler, President, Mobilife Corp., Dec. 2, 1961.
68. See State ex rel. Landis v. Gifford, 114 Fla. 872, 154 So. 893 (1934).
69. Compare MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 59, § 5 (Supp. 1961) (exempting real property of
widows, orphans, aged persons (17th exemption), and disabled veterans (22d A exemp-
tion)), with fAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 140 § 326 (1957) (imposing monthly fee on mobile
home owners without exception).
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PROPOSED: EXTENSION OF REAL PROPERTY TAX
The ideal of equal tax treatment could be pursued by extending the realty
tax to mobile homes or by taxing stationary homes under a fee system or at
the same effective rates applied to mobile homes taxed as personalty. On an
abstract level, the choice should perhaps hinge on a prior determination of
whether the ad valorem or pay-as-you-go method is more equitable or other-
wise socially preferred. That fundamental question, however, may be avoided
by one primarily interested in practical alleviation of the present disparity in
tax treatment of the owners of mobile as opposed to stationary housing. The
laws of legislative inertia clearly indicate that if the unequal tax treatment of
a relatively small group is to be corrected and there is a tax which already
accounts for the overwhelming proportion of local government revenues, the
desired change will be effected-if at all-by an extension of that already
predominant tax. The real estate tax accounts for an estimated 85 per cent of
local government revenues, 99 per cent of their tax revenues.70 As a practical
matter, therefore, if mobile home owners are to be accorded tax treatment
equal to that of other home owners the modus operandi no doubt will be an ex-
tension of the real property tax.71
Critical to the likelihood of so extending the realty tax would be its ability
to raise at least as much net revenue for the community as presently is re-
ceived from mobile homes. There would seem to be no reason why mobile
home owners as a group should yield less when taxed on an ad valorem basis
than when taxed at a flat rate. Some economies of scale in tax collection might
even be achieved if, instead of maintaining two tax programs, existing realty
tax machinery were utilized in the taxation of mobile homes.72 Even if such
economies did not materialize, however, communities which today do not tax
mobile homes or tax them ineffectively because they lack an adequate dis-
covery process might find the additional, potential revenue from mobile homes
sufficient to make a program worthwhile.
The attempt to apply a realty tax to mobile homes does present some un-
70. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES IN 1955 at 20
(1956).
71. It should be noted, however, that if the realty tax on mobile homes exceeds the tax
currently paid, present mobile home residents may be induced to move their homes to areas
where taxes are lower. Mobile home owners are perhaps more likely to move as a result of
tax increases than are owners of conventional housing. Other owners, who would have to
sell their homes in order to move to a lower tax area, may find that the market price of their
homes has fallen by the capitalized value of the tax. See generally GROVES, FINANCING
GOVERNMENT 127-29 (4th ed. 1954). If this has happened, they may remain, reasoning that
the effect of the tax increase cannot be avoided by moving.
This being true, the realty tax, with exemptions for favored groups, might be used to
"tax out" unwanted mobile home residents. But selective exclusion of low income groups or
large families may better be accomplished by setting minimum per capita living space re-
quirements, or raising park standards.




usual administrative problems at each stage in the taxing process--discovery,
assessment, collection, and enforcement. The threshold problem is that of
finding the mobile homes, particularly the recent arrivals. This problem is not
new to communities which presently tax mobile homes by fee systems or
personal property tax; nor is it unique, for communities already facing the simi-
lar task of locating regular building additions and new construction. This prob-
lem could be solved by making periodic inspections to determine if mobile homes
have arrived. Such inspections could be relied on either as the sole method
of discovery or as a check on other sources of information. The inspections
could be made by the same assessors who presently search for other recent im-
provements. They would be simplified by the zoning regulations already
common in urban areas restricting mobile homes to licensed parks.73 Particu-
larly in larger communities, however, the discovery process would be more
economical if a permit were required before a mobile home could be located
or occupied in the community.7 4 Such a requirement would assist local dis-
covery just as building permit ordinances do in the case of other improve-
ments. A further check would be provided by requiring mobile home owners
to declare their destinations when applying for a permit to move their homes;
such permits are already required in many states. The issuing agency could
then notify the tax assessor of the prospective home. The efficacy of the
moving permit as a discovery device would depend on the ability and willing-
ness of home owners to declare their exact destination, including their in-
tended street address in a metropolitan area, and the good will and efficiency
of the issuing agency. As yet another check, park owners could be com-
pelled to report arrivals of mobile homes without permits, or all arrivals in
jurisdictions which do not require moving or location permits.7 6
As with any ad valorem tax, the problem of valuation would have to be met
if the realty tax were extended to mobile homes. But the availability of manu-
facturers' original prices and current market values should ease the assess-
ment problem considerably,77 and additions to mobile homes should be no
more difficult to assess than other building improvements. Some unusual tim-
ing problems might arise by virtue of the mobility of the homes, but in view
of the relatively low actual turnover of mobile homes the problem should
73. HODES & ROBERTSON 36.
74. HODES & ROBERTSON. 37-39. Michigan requires a permit to occupy a mobile home
outside a licensed park. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 5.278(21) (1961).
75, Most states require special permits before large mobile homes may be moved. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 91 (1959) ; ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1002, 1004, 1011 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-822 (Supp. 1961).
76. Such reports presently are required in many jurisdictions. E.g., ARrz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 42-642 (1956) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-3303 (Supp. 1960) ; IOwA CODE ANN. § 135D.9
(Supp. 1960) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.260(2) (1960).
77. Many states presently use manufacturers' prices or current market values in ap-
praising mobile homes for tax purposes. E.g., ARIz. CoNST. art. 9, § 11; CAL. Rv. & TAX
CODE § 10752; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-6(4) (Supp. 1957); Miss. CODE ANN. §
10007-10 (Supp. 1958).
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not prove fiscally embarrassing. To be sure, if mobile homes are assessed on
one "assessment day" annually, no tax will be received from homes which
later enter the taxing district. But if the turnover problem did prove to be
serious, it could be met by a continuous or periodic assessment process.
78
Likewise, where local permits are required before a home may be placed in
the community, they might be conditioned upon evidence of payment of the
tax for the remainder of the year. Alternatively, continuous taxation of mobile
homes might be triggered by notice from moving permits, park owners, or
local inspectors. Once the mobile home was located and taxed for the balance
of the initial year, it could be treated as other property.
Passing the problem of assessment, it must be decided whether the tax
should be levied on the home owner or the land owner. Of course, this ques-
tion is academic where both home and site have a single owner, as in large
subdivided parks in which lots are sold to individuals who place their homes
upon them ;79 in rural areas, where individual mobile homes are placed on
their owner's land ;80 and in parks whose owners rent out the homes as well
as the land on which they rest.8 1 In these situations all the property is assessed
to the owner of the land; if the mobile home is moved, the land remains as
-curity for the tax. If, on the other hand, a home on a rented site is assessed to
the home owner rather than the landowner an important collateral question is
whether delinquent taxes could be made to constitute a lien upon the land
(though owned by a third party) as well as the home. If the lien is held to
apply to the home only, the value of the security is diminished by the ability
of the home owner to abscond, taking his home with him. To discourage tax-
prompted moves, many states presently condition the issuance of moving per-
mits on the exhibition of proper tax receipts.8 2 If so much responsibility for
tax enforcement is to rest upon the moving permit, it should be enforced on
a state-wide basis. Highway patrols should be instructed to inspect homes in
transit for permits stating the date of issue, the destination and the descrip-
tion of the home. Violations should be punished by fines for the home owner
and towing agent, or revocation of the towing agent's license. 3 If only local
78. Some states presently provide for continuous assessment. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 42-601(b) (1956). Indiana provides for semi-annual assessment of mobile homes.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-3305 (Supp. 1960).
79. See BARTLEY & BAIR 41-42; see generally Findley, Own Your Own Lot at Trailer
Estates, Trail-R-News, March 1960, p. 10.
80. See Cravford v. Wesleyville, 68 Pa. D. & C. 215, 216 (C.P. 1949) ; see generally
BARTLEY & BAIR 99.
81. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorham, 12 Misc. 2d 285, 287, 175 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (Sup. Ct.
1957) ; Crawford v. Wesleyville, 68 Pa. D. & C. 215, 216 (C.P. 1949) ; Kelly v. City of San
Diego, 63 Cal. App. 2d 638, 641 (1944). Rentals presently are unlawful in California. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18252.
82. E.g., ARK. STAT. § 75-133.3 (1957) ; IDAHo CODE ANN. § 49-155 (Supp. 1961);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 42-102 (Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-173 (Supp. 1959).
83. Many states issue permits to move large mobile homes only to licensed transporters.
E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-822, -823 (Supp. 1960); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 35790. - .
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sanctions are brought to bear on violation of the permit regulations, it is
not likely they will prove an effective adjunct to the tax program. The cost
of locating a tax delinquent home which had been moved and foreclosing
the tax lien might alone be prohibitive. Even greater security could be
provided if the tax, though due from the home owner, were made a lien upon
the land.8 4 The land owner in turn, if forced to pay the tax to prevent fore-
closure, would be given a lien on the home to the extent of the tax paid on
its'behalf.8, Despite this modicum of protection a landowner subject to such
a lien for the tax deficiencies of his tenants could be expected to cooperate
fully with the authorities by reporting all movements of mobile homes by his
tenants. Such a scheme should therefore contribute directly to the enforce-
ment of moving permit requirements and indirectly to the collection of taxes
due from mobile home owners.
A somewhat similar result could be achieved if homes located on rented
land were assessed directly to the landowner."0 This, however, would raise
other difficult problems. Extending the benefits of special tax exemptions to
particular groups of mobile home users would be more difficult. In the first
place, it would be difficult to make sure the occupants received the intended
tax benefit in the form of reduced rent. Secondly, land owners might justly
complain that homes, present on the day of assessment, may not re-
main the entire tax year and that others as valuable may not replace
them. 7 On the other hand, the park owner may get a windfall if more valu-
able units enter after assessment date. 8 Moreover, the park owner can pro-
tect himself by collecting in advance an amount equal to th6 full year's taxes
on the mobile home. Similarly, increased operating costs caused by changes in
tax rates can be shifted to the residents by careful drafting of their leases.
Indeed, the park owner may profit from the system if, after collecting, the
tax before its due date, he is able to pocket the interest on these funds in the
interim together with any discount the municipality offers for early payment
of taxes.8 9
Previous attempts to tax mobile homes as realty have been subjected
to a variety of legal attacks. The realty tax has been challenged by both
84. Cf. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-203 (1956).
85. In many states park owners have a statutory lien on mobile homes for various
charges. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 85.28 (1943) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-3-14, -3-16 (1960).
Land owners could protect themselves by requiring home owners to make a deposit from
which, on departure, unpaid taxes could be deducted.
86. In New York mobile homes may be assessed to the owners of the land on which
they are located. N.Y. TAx LAWS § 2 (6-a).
87. Cf. New York Trailer Coach Ass'n v. Steckel, 208 Misc. 308, 312, 144 N.Y.S.2d 82,
86 (1955), rcv'd on other grounds, 3 App. Div. 2d 643, 158 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1956).
88. Although there is no indication that current park rentals are graduated according to
the value of the home to be placed upon them, such graduation would probably result from
assessing the value of the mobile homes to the park owners.
89. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.41 (1958).
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home 90 and park 91 owners who claim the homes are personalty. In some
cases, support was drawn from the common law of "fixtures," under which
the dispositive issue was whether an "intent" to make a permanent attach-
ment could be found.9 2 Since such an intent was hard to establish where
mobile homes were concerned, some courts applying the fixture doctrine con-
cluded that they could not be taxed as realty.92 This refusal to permit the
extension of the realty tax may have been predicated in part on a reluctance
to proceed in the absence of legislation specifically authorizing communities
to tax mobile homes as realty.9 The first pre-statute decisions, now a decade
old, subordinated community needs for revenues to a concern for the plight
of park owners who would be liable for taxes on homes which might vanish
overnight.95 Perhaps these cases should have been decided on whether the
community had given the landowner sufficient time to shift the tax to the
residents, either directly through prepayment for taxes or indirectly through
advance rent deposits or increased rents. The owner's legitimate demands
would seem to be met if tax rebates were made in situations where the owner
had not been afforded a reasonable period in which to protect himself be-
fore the tax was levied. Where, however, the park owner received due notice
or was eligible for tax refunds, he would seem to be in no different position
vis-a-vis the realty tax than any other landlord in the community.
Instead of trying to divine whether state legislation meant the words
"personalty" or "realty" to retain their common law definition, the question
the courts might better have sought to determine is why the legislature
exempted personalty from the category of items to be taxed, and whether the
reasons would apply to mobile homes. One reason for exempting tangible
personalty, particularly inventories, is that the value of property on hand
changes throughout the year making it unfair to pick a specific day for assess-
ment, and too difficult to determine an average value.90 This would hardly
justify extending the exemption to the mobile home; its value, like that of
90. See, e.g., Hartman v. Fulton County, 24 Pa. D. & C. 2d 611 (C.P. 1961) ; Coyle
Assessment, 17 Pa. D. & C. 2d 149 (C.P. 1958); Fryer Appeal, 81 Pa. D. & C. 139 (C.P.
1951).
91. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorham, 12 Misc. 2d 285, 175 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Beagell v. Douglas, 2 Misc. 2d 361, 157 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ; Streyle v. Board of
Property Assessment, 173 Pa. Super. 324 (1953).
92. See generally 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
93. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorham, 12 Misc. 2d 285, 175 N.Y.S.2d 376,387 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Streyle v. Board of Property Assessment, 173 Pa. Super. 324, 328-29 (1953); Mason
Appeal, 75 Pa. D. & C. 1, 8-9, 12 (C.P. 1950).
94. See Stewart v. Carrington, 203 Misc. 543, 546, 119 N.Y.S.2d 778, 781 (Sup. Ct.
1953). But cf. Barnes v. Gorham, supra note 93 (statute specifically authorizing assessment of
mobile homes as realty found unconstitutional.).
95. See, e.g., Mason Appeal, 75 Pa. D. & C. 1, 2 (C.P. 1950) ; Fryer Appeal, 81 Pa.
D. & C. 139, 142-43 (C.P. 1951) ; Streyle v. Board of Assessments, 173 Pa. Super. 324, 328
(1953).
96. See, e.g., GROVE, FINANCING GOVERNMENT 93 (4th ed. 1955).
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other dwellings, remains relatively constant throughout the year. Another
reason given for exemption is that personalty is often difficult to appraise
fairly, there being no adequate standards for assessing used home furnishings
or wardrobes.9 7 But mobile homes do have readily determined market values.98
Another persuasive reason for exempting personalty may have been the ease
with which it is concealed ;99 honest taxpayers are penalized and the dishonest
benefitted if services are supported through taxes on property so easily hid-
den. The visibility of mobile homes, however, is substantially greater than that
of securities, cash, clothing and other personalty. Had these courts recognized
that mobile homes are, after all, homes, that they serve the same function as
other housing, there might have been considerably less reluctance to tax them
as other homes are taxed-as realty. Notwithstanding the fact that the exemp-
tion of the homes of one class of residents restricts the tax base and arbitrarily
shifts their share of the tax burden to other residents, °0  these cases demon-
strate that specific enabling legislation may be necessary if courts are to be
persuaded that communities should be allowed to tax mobile homes as realty.
In Pennsylvania and New York, the legislatures did attempt to provide
express statutory authority to levy a realty tax on mobile homes against land-
owners on whose property the home was found on assessment day.10 1 The
Pennsylvania statute, however, opens the door to the same factual disputes
which plagued the common law by including in its definition of taxable real
estate only mobile homes "permanently attached to the land." The only two
cases to have construed this limitation indicate the difficulty of predicting the
97. See, e.g., POOLE, PunLIc FINANCE & ECONOMIC WELFARE 279 (1956); GROVE,
supra note 96, at 69.
98. Market values are presently used in mobile home appraisal. See Miss. CODE ANN. §
10007-10 (Supp. 1958) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.485 (2) (1960).
99. POOLE, supra note 97, at 279. DUE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 390-91 (1959).
100. See generally DUE, supra note 99, at 391; GRoVE, supra note 96, at 85.
101. N.Y. TAx LAWS § 2 (6-a) provides:
a. In addition to their meaning as provided in subdivision six, the terms "land,"
"real estate," and "real property," as used in this chapter, include all the forms of
housing which are adaptable to motivation by a power connected thereto or which
may be propelled by a power within themselves and which are or can be used as a
house or living abode or habitation of one or more persons, or for business, commercial
or office purposes, either temporarily or permanently, and commonly called and
hereafter referred to as "trailers"; except (1) transient trailers which have been
located within the boundaries of a tax district for less than sixty days and (2)
trailers which are for sale and which are not occupied.
b. Trailers shall be assessed to the owners of the real property on which they are
located.
c. For the purposes of this subdivision, the term "tax district" shall include a
village.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-201 (Supp. 1960) provides:
The following subjects and property shall ... be... subject to taxation for all
county, city, borough, town, township, school and poor purposes at the annual rate:
a. All real estate, to wit: Houses, house trailers permanently attached to land ....
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classification into which the typical mobile home will fall. In Coyle Assess-
ment,10 2 three homes were assessed to a landowner who owned but one of
them. The homes rested on cement blocks, were connected to utilities, and had
been in place over two years. The court disregarded "self serving statements
by the parties" who denied any intent to make a permanent attachment, and
found sufficient actual attachment to justify considering the homes as realty.10 3
In Hartman v. Fulton County,104 however, a contrary result was reached
despite the fact the home there involved had also been placed on cement
blocks and connected to utilities. Thus, tax assessors, park owners, and
mobile home occupants trying to forecast the decision in the next "attach-
ment" case have a predictability factor the same as a gambler who bets the
tossed coin will land on its head. Whatever its predictive deficiencies, however,
the Pennsylvania statute has been upheld against fourteenth amendment
challenges.10 5
New York's enabling statute, on the other hand, which has no attachment
limitation, has been held unconstitutional in two of the four lower courts in
which it has been challenged.' 0 6 The irrepressible vitality of the common law
is evidenced by the fact that both of these courts admitted that no constitu-
tional objection would have been sustained had the assessed mobile homes
been attached.10 7 Apparently these two New York courts were troubled by
the possibility of the landowner being held liable for tax on homes which did
not remain on his property. 08 But the sole authority cited by either New
York court to support the contention that property may not constitutionally be
assessed to a person other than its owner was Hoeper v. Tax Commission.'00
That 1931 United States Supreme Court opinion, occasioning vigorous dis-
sent when written 110 and disregarded or distinguished ever since,1 1 held
invalid a Wisconsin statute which taxed a husband for his wife's income. The
102. 17 Pa. D. & C. 2d 149 (C.P. 1958).
103. Id. at 152.
104. 24 Pa. D. & C. 2d 611 (C.P. 1961).
105. Coyle Assessment, 17 Pa. D. & C. 2d 149, 153 (C.P. 1958).
106. Compare Beagell v. Douglas, 2 Misc. 2d 361, 157 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1955) and
Feld v. Hanna, 4 Misc. 2d 3, 158 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1956) with Barnes v. Gorham, 12
Misc. 2d 285,' 175 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1957) and New York Trailer Coach Ass'n v.
Steckel, 208 Misc. 308, 144 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 3 App.
Div. 2d 643, 158 N Y.S.2d 179 (1956).
107. Barnes v. Gorham, mepra note 106, at 296, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87; New York
Trailer Coach Ass'n v. Steckel, supra note 106, at 311, 313, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 86, 88.
108. Barnes v. Gorham supra note 106, at 294-95, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 385; New York
Trailer Coach Ass'n. v. Steckel, supra note 106, at 312, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
109. 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
110. Dissent by Mr. Justice Holmes, joined by Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice
Stone. 284 U.S. at 218.
111. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 365 (1945) (concurring opinion) ; Whitney v.
State Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 530, 541 (1940) ; Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172, 178 (1933) ;
Albanese D'Imperio v. Secretary of Treasury, 223 F.2d 413, 415 (1st Cir. 1955) ; Bal-
lester v. Descartes, 181 F.2d 823, 828-29 (1st Cir. 1950).
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husband in that case had no claim or control over his wife's income, nor any
means short of divorce to prevent the tax liability from accruing against him.
These factors are not present in the case of a park owner assessed for mobile
homes located on his property. In commercial contexts property taxes im-
posed upon non-owners have been upheld if the taxpayer was in a position to
receive financial benefit from the property for which he was taxed.1 2 The
test of due process enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ott v. Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Co.113 "is whether the tax in practical operation has rela-
tion to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the tax-
ing State."" 4 That the park owner benefits from general public services even
the two protesting New York courts conceded. 1 5 One of the courts even
suggested that the park owners' land assessment should be increased to make
them "responsible for the proportionate cost of government which should be
borne by the trailer residents upon such land."" 6 This is precisely what the
realty tax, assessing homes to the landowner, seeks to accomplish.
Thus it would seem that there is no constitutional impediment to extend-
ing realty taxes to mobile homes, at least where they can be said to be "per-
manently" attached to the land. What constitutional problems have arisen
were occasioned by attempts to tax the owners of the land on which the
mobile homes rested rather than the owners of the homes; and even this hurdle
seems surmountable in view of the modern commercial setting if it should be
deemed more efficient to levy the tax, in first instance, on the landlord. And
the administrative difficulties which would attend such an extension of realty
taxes have been shown to be of a relatively low order. There seems therefore
tp be no justification for the maintenance of the present systems with their
inherently unequal treatment of one group of home owners. If progress is to
be made in this direction, however, it will have to be initiated in many
jurisdidtions on the state rather than the local level. Even if specific enabling
legislation should ultimately prove unnecessary, many communities will be
unable to tax mobile homes because of existing legislation permitting the
home owners fo pay certain fees in lieu of all other taxation of their mobile
ho'mes. With mobile homes being produced at an ever-increasing rate, it is
time the community turned its attention to equalizing its tax treatment of
home owners generally.
112, See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Kentucky, 218 U.S. 551 (1910); Thompson v. Kentucky,
Z09 U.S. 340 (1908) ; Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904).
113. 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
, 114, Id.at 174.
115. .Barnes v. Gorham, 12 Misc. 2d 285, 293, 175 N.Y.S.2d, 376, 384 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
New York Trailer Coach Ass'n v. Steckel, 208 Misc. 308, 311, 144 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
116. Barnes v. Gorham, supra note 115, at 293, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
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